Sunday, September 19, 2010

New York Corruption - Motion to Re-Open - Court had NO Juristication Due to Appeal. Where is Andrew Cuomo?

Iviewit Inventor Eliot Ivan Bernstein Supports Kevin McKeown aka Frank Brady Federal
Lawsuit Regarding Stolen 9.11 Red Cross Funds Legally Related by Federal Judge Shira
Scheindlin to New York Supreme Court Whistleblower Christine C. Anderson Lawsuit. READ

ALL ABOUT IT @ EXPOSE CORRUPT COURTS!!!

Article Courtesy of Expose Corrupt Courts @
http://exposecorruptcourts.blogspot.com/2010/09/federal-court-asked-to-reopen-another.html

Thursday, September 16, 2010
Federal Court Asked To Reopen Another NY State Corruption Case


Plaintiff,

-against- 08 Civ 2391 (SAS)
PLAINTIFF’S AFFIRMATION IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO REOPEN


THE STATE OF NEW YORK; THE OFFICE OF COURT
ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM;
THE N.Y. STATE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT;
THE N.Y.S. 1ST DEPT., DEPARTMENTAL DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE;
THE N.Y.S. GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE, 9TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT;

THOMAS J. CAHILL, in his official and individual capacity; AFFIRMATION

SHERRY K. COHEN, in her official and individual capacity; IN SUPPORT OF
GARY L. CASELLA, in his official and individual capacity; MOTION TO
NANCY J. BARRY, in her official and individual capacity;

REOPEN
FRANCIS A. NICOLAI, in his official and individual capacity;
JOSEPH M. ACCETTA, in his official and individual capacity,
ROBERT M. DIBELLA, in his official and individual capacity;

ANTHONY A. SCARPINO, in his official and individual capacity;
ROBERT A. KORREN; JEFFREY A. MCNAMARA;

PATRICIA BAVE-PLANELL; GIULINI & GIULINI, ESQS.;
CHARLES A. GIULINI, individually and as a partner of
Giulini and Giulini; CHRISTINE GIULINI, individually and
as a parter of Giulini and Giulini; CATHERINE M. MIKLITSCH
MCQUADE & MCQUADE, ESQS.; JOSEPH F. MCQUADE,
individually and as a partner of McQuade & McQuade;
MICHAEL D. MCQUADE, individually and as a partner of
McQuade & McQuade; and JOHN and JANE DOES, 1-20,
Defendants.

————————————————————————x

Plaintiff Kevin McKeown, pro se, respectfully moves this day, September 11, 2010, for an order reopening the above captioned matter based upon new facts, a fraud upon this Honorable Court and pursuant to F.R.C.P. 60 (b) and (d)(3), inter alia.

As this Honorable Court is aware, this case concerns $140,000.00 stolen from American Red Cross 9/11 donation money- still unpaid; What this court has not known, until now, is that the defendants have defrauded this court as they have knowingly acted without required jurisdiction, inter alia, thus void of any immunity.

Background

1. The operative 1st Amended Complaint was filed on May 12, 2008 (Attached hereto as EXHIBIT “A”) On August 8, 2008, this Honorable Court dismissed the action (EXHIBIT “B”).

On May 12, 2009, this Honorable Court found that the Court had no jurisdiction since the matter was on appeal; the appeal was only finalized on August 12, 2010 (See attached 08cv2391 Docket Sheet EXHIBIT “C”).

All filings in this application are respectfully herein incorporated as if fully annexed. As this Honorable Court has only again had jurisdiction less than 30 days, the herein request is timely and, in the interest of justice, must be granted.

A Knowing and Deliberate Fraud Upon This Court

2. The defendants were stripped of jurisdiction in the underlying action on November 4, 2003 by well-settled New York State Law. Their filings and actions are VOID under New York State law. And since they acted without jurisdiction, they cannot by law assert any type of immunity.

CLICK HERE TO SEE FILED DOCUMENT WITH EXHIBITS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
————————————————————————x
KEVIN MCKEOWN,

3. The defendants were aware that as a matter of New York State law, all proceedings had been stayed since November 4, 2003 when a party interested in the underlying proceeding committed suicide. Defendant attorneys Patricia Bave-Planell, Frank Streng, Robert Korren and Joseph McQuade, among others, have knowingly failed to file the only Motion that could ever be filed or accepted: a required on-notice substitution of party papers. (Weber v Bellinger, 124 AD2d 1009). It is uncontested that the required substitution has never been filed.

The New York State law is simple: without party substitution upon the death of an interested party, there is no jurisdiction.

Accordingly, Immunity of any kind does not apply in this matter. All attorneys and State actors had an ethical obligation to advise this Court.

4. Even the state defendants, and their attorneys, have ignored their own obligation to follow state law and to report or take action against those who were violating state laws and attorney ethical codes and, further, who were improperly acting without jurisdiction.

5. This Court must look very dimly upon the attorneys in this action who have failed to bring to this Honorable Court’s attention the fact that laws and ethical codes of conduct had been violated by attorneys and state actors in this very proceeding.

All attorneys were aware that the state law has always been clear regarding the lack of jurisdiction upon the death of an interested party. But these attorneys advanced known void rulings to this Court, or fraudulently asserted immunity claims when such protection had been stripped by the lack of jurisdiction.

6. As alleged in the 1st Amended Complaint, and as accepted as true in the Court’s August 8, 2008 dated order of dismissal, a wide-range cover-up was put in place to hide the improper filings of attorney Frank Streng- a publicly advertised friend, supporter and insider of the judge who accept his improper filings and who himself would subsequently make rulings without jurisdiction.

Without the Proper Substitution of a Party, The State Actors Lacked Jurisdiction

7. It is well-settled law that the lack of the proper substitution of a party in an action renders all subsequent orders null and void as the court lacks jurisdiction (see, Bossert v Ford Motor Co., 140 AD2d 480; Silvagnoli v Consolidated Edison Employees Mut. Aid Socy., 112 AD2d 819) None of the state actors had jurisdiction since November 4, 2003.

Each and every order since November 4, 2003 is VOID as a matter of law (see, Byrd v Johnson, 67 AD2d 992). The defendants’, and their attorneys’, knowing failure to act without jurisdiction is the essence of the denial of due process. And their silence of the violations of the known laws are a fraud.

8. I have no other remedy of law. My filings to: state administrative judges; all higher state courts; all court, attorney and judicial ethical bodies have only resulted in retaliation and threats against me.

Meanwhile, not one entity, including the New York State Attorney General’s Office, has disputed the lack of jurisdiction since November 4, 2003.

The collective silence by the defendants, state actors and attorneys on what I now know as basic New York State Required Party-Substitution law begs this Court’s immediate action.

9. The state actors improperly continued proceedings with the full knowledge that as a matter of law all proceedings were stayed upon the death of an interested party- all in complete violation of my rights concerning due process.

(Brown v Konczeski, 242 A.D.2d 847; CPLR 1015, 1021). Indeed, the attorneys involved have never disputed their collective failure to file On-Notice Substitution of Party papers since all matters were stayed, by law, on November 4, 2003. Notably, not one defendant disputes that all matters have been stayed since November 4, 2003, and by operation of well-settled state law.

10. If the 1st Amended Complaint is taken as true, then the thereto-annexed timeline of the illegal court filings confirms the lack of the required party-substitution submission.

While I am not an attorney and did not know this law when I filed my complaint, surely the defendants were aware of the state law requiring party substitution. Indeed, the involved attorneys (who financially benefited from the fraud), court clerks (who were friends of the attorney who filed the fraudulent assignment) and the Surrogate Judge (who would later recuse himself because of his admitted and advertised closeness with the attorney who filed the fraudulent assignment)– were aware of the state law requiring party substitution.

THE UNDERLYING FRAUD

11. Ronald P. McKeown, Jr., purportedly executed an “Assignment of Share in Estate” and an “Affidavit Re Assignment of Share in Estate” (hereinafter collectively as the “ASSIGNMENT”), dated October 30, 2003, with knowledge that its purpose was to defraud creditors of the assignor, the IRS, the State of Texas, to advance a deception upon the Surrogate’s court, and violate various state laws of New York and Connecticut.

12. In is uncontested that within days after Ronald’s death on November 4, 2003, Frank W. Streng, Esq., attorney of record for Ronald, presented the purported assignment for filing in the Surrogate’s Court. In Addition, Mr. Streng subsequently filed his own attorney affidavits in the Surrogate’s Court referencing and relying upon that fraudulent assignment.

13. Irrefutable evidence exists of collusion between the state actors, state agencies, and certain “influential” lawyers who sought to improperly profit at my expense, and who have damaged me and violated various federally protected rights. The lawyers against whom damages are sought had numerous ethical complaints filed, all of which asserted similar violations of the mandatory disciplinary regulations. But they were protected by Corrupt NYS Attorney Ethics bodies.

14. Testimony before this Honorable Court in Anderson, began the process of unmasking State employees, and others, who have improperly acted under the color of law. Without a fair and objective trial in U.S. District Court of the substantive Constitutional and Civil Rights issues, including demonstration of offenses with the evidence, systemic State corruption becomes Law of the Land, superior to all Constitutionally guaranteed rights and contrary to all U.S. Codes.

15. The actions of the defendants violate my equal rights and other guaranteed rights that are explicitly protected by the U.S. Constitution and U.S. laws cited in the complaint and herein. Such violations are federal questions correctly before this U.S. District Court. The Eleventh Amendment no longer applies as the new fact of action by state actors without jurisdiction is now known to this Honorable Court.

16. I respectfully requesting that in addition to re-opening the instant case, that the Honorable Court sua sponte appoint a federal monitor to oversee the day-to-day operations of the New York State Attorney and Judicial Ethics bodies for an indefinite period of time.

Continuing Evidence of Plaintiff’s Allegations of Widespread Corruption

17. Plaintiff also respectfully renews the request for this Honorable Court to immediately schedule a hearing to take the testimony of two New York State judges, and who at all times have wanted to appear before this Court to discuss the widespread corruption as herein alleged. (The Judges’ affidavits are attached hereto as EXHIBIT “D” and EXHIBIT “E”)

18. Taking all the allegations in plaintiff’s Amended Complaint as true, plaintiff has properly alleged that the individual defendants acted in numerous instances to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights to due process, equal protection of the law, and other constitutional violations. Because these individual defendants are state actors, and have blatantly used “the badge[s] of their authority to deprive [plaintiff] of [his] federally guaranteed rights” under the United States Constitution, § 1983 is the vehicle by which plaintiff may seek and obtain his much-needed relief. Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 161.

Because § 1983 is a federal statute, this Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate plaintiff’s claims. And because it is now known that the state actors knowingly acted without jurisdiction, this case is now ripe for immediate discovery and trial.

19. Indeed, just like this federal court, the courts of New York State (including the DDC) are entrusted with the responsibility of adjudicating the merits of cases without self-dealing, corruption, and illegality.

However, plaintiff’s complaint states that such courts have not so performed their duties; rather, plaintiff’s complaint alleges numerous acts of corruption, illegal activity, and obstruction of justice in the operation of the courts of New York State.

Given that the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint are taken as true, plaintiff’s allegations state legitimate claims for relief, and ones now known to have been void of any immunity.

20. Indeed, because this Court has already stated that the DDC is “an arm” of the NY State Courts, and is “the court” itself, plaintiff maintains that he merely requested an unbiased, fair and honest court system to adjudicate his claims. Simply put, plaintiff simply requested that the courts of New York State honestly do their job.

Plaintiff has alleged that he was deprived of this very basic right, which necessarily deprived him of his right to due process of law, a free and fair court system, and the right to petition his government. These constitutional violations demand federal redress, and plainly provide this Court with federal jurisdiction.

21. The United States Constitution does permit this Court to review the decisions of the EMPLOYEES of New York State (and other lawyers).

The Supreme Court found in Jett v. Dallas Independent School_District (491 U.S. 701 (1989)), that 42 U.S.C. §1981 by its terms prohibits private discrimination as well as discrimination under color of state law.

The Court considered whether §1981 created a private right of action to enforce that prohibition against state actors.

The Court concluded that, “the express cause of action for damages created by §1983 constitutes the exclusive federal remedy for violation of the rights guaranteed in §1981 by state governmental units.” (Id. at 720-721, 733).

22. “A plaintiff may sue a state official acting in his official capacity - notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment - for prospective, injunctive relief from violations of federal law.” (Opinion and Order, p36). And as now known, the Eleventh Amendment does not apply here.

23. The U.S. Supreme Court in Scheuer v. Rhodes (416 U.S. 232 (1974)) held: “The Eleventh Amendment does not in some circumstances bar an action for damages against a state official charged with depriving a person of a federal right under color of state law, and the District Court acted prematurely and hence erroneously in dismissing the complaints as it did without affording petitioners any opportunity by subsequent proof to establish their claims.”

24. Further in Scheuer v Rhodes, the Court noted “If the immunity is qualified, [416 U.S. 232, 243] not absolute, the scope of that immunity will necessarily be related to facts as yet not established either by affidavits, admissions, or a trial record.

Final resolution of this question must take into account the functions and responsibilities of these particular defendants in their capacities as officers of the state government, as well as the purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1983″. Now known is the fact that even qualified immunity cannot now be asserted as jurisdiction had been stripped.

25. “[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” (Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982) 457 U.S. 800, 818 [73 L.Ed.2d 396, 410]). Here, state actors knew they lacked jurisdiction.

26. I assert violations of civil rights and other rights of which so-called “legal professionals” “would have known”. The state actors and the “legal professionals” also should have known that their jurisdiction had been stayed upon the death of an interested party.

I also asserted evidence to demonstrate that such violations of guaranteed rights are planned, intentional, and organized for profit to the chosen few who are lawyers and officials benefiting at my expense. I also assert that discovery would further verify the civil and criminal allegations made by me are already confirmed as plausible.

27. Title 42 U.S.C. §1988 in relevant part confers on the district courts “protection of all person in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause” (emphasis added).

28. This Court was not asked to review State of New York court decisions. The acts, without jurisdiction, of State employees were described to demonstrate such actions resulted in the conspiracy against my rights.

Title 42 U.S.C. §1985 (2) applies to obstructing justice; intimidating a party, or witness if “two or more persons in any State … conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State”.

29. In Zahrey v. City of New York, (No. 98 Civ. 4546(LAP), 1999), on a motion to dismiss, the District Court dismissed the claims against defendant Coffey on the ground of qualified immunity.

Without determining whether a prosecutor’s fabrication of evidence violated a constitutional right, this Court ruled that Coffey was entitled to qualified immunity because “the law was not `clearly established’ in 1996 that a prosecutor’s fabrication of evidence violated a person’s constitutional rights.”

30. On appeal to the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, (Zahrey v. Coffey, No. 99-9119), this Court’s dismissal was reversed and remanded: “We hold that there is a constitutional right not to be deprived of liberty as a result of the fabrication of evidence by a government officer acting in an investigatory capacity, at least where the officer foresees that he himself will use the evidence with a resulting deprivation of liberty. … [W]e conclude that the allegations of the complaint suffice to indicate that a qualified immunity defense may not be sustained without further development of the facts.”

31. In Gloria Perez, et. al v. Jesus Ortiz, et. al, 849 F. 2d 793 (2nd Cir. 1988), the court, “held that the district court erred in dismissing the claims sua sponte without giving plaintiffs notice and an opportunity to be heard, and abused its discretion in dismissing the official capacity suits against appellees without giving appellants an opportunity to amend their complaints to conform to the requirements for such a suit.”

ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE IS INAPPLICABLE

32. There are not State proceedings dealing with the issues raised in Plaintiff’s complaint, or with these Defendants; the relief sought (injunctive relief against the state and money damages against individuals) has not been sought in State courts. This District Court has not been asked to change any State decisions.

Plaintiff’s complaint does not concern actions properly “judicial in nature” since Plaintiff asserts lack of Eleventh Amendment Immunity and the fact that acts by individuals beyond the legal limits of their official positions occurred, thereby harming Plaintiff by deprivation of substantive and material guaranteed rights under U.S. laws.

33. The Supreme Court case of Exxon Mobil Corn. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (544 U.S. 280 (2005)) clearly shows that claim preclusion is a separate doctrine entirely. In Exxon the requisite elements that must be met for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply are defined as:

(a) First: The case must be brought in District Court by a party that has already lost in state court.

(b) Second: The injury claimed must be as a result of the judgment itself. There is no “judgment” in my case. The complaint in District Court concerns on-going abuse of civil rights under color of state law without jurisdiction, or state authority, by state employees and other lawyers causing damages to Plaintiff;

(c) Third: A final judgment on the state court proceeding must have already been rendered before the federal action is brought. This does not apply here.

(d) Fourth: The federal case must invite review and rejection of the state law claim; if the claims are not identical, the Federal claim must be inextricably intertwined with the state law claim, so as to implicate common facts pertaining to the same transaction or occurrence. (District of Columbia Court of Anneals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,483 n. 16 (1983)).

This does not apply to my case. Since official corruption causing deprivation of civil rights was not part of any State proceeding, there was no previous injury from judgment since there was no final State court judgment, therefore Rooker-Feldman does not apply.

STANDING

34. I asserts widespread and systemic corruption by State employees acting in violation of their oaths of office and without jurisdiction. I believe that such abuses of official positions should be immediately stopped by injunctive relief and by appointing a Federal Monitor.

35. Three tests determine if a would-be plaintiff has standing: the litigant must show: (a) that he has suffered personally some actual or threatened injury; (b) that the injury must be fairly traceable to the alleged illegal conduct of the defendant, and (c) that the injury must likely be redressed by a favorable decision.

(Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)). Causation and redressability are required (Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41-43 (1976)). The Supreme Court has referred to the “injury-in fact” standard as the “irreducible minimum” required by the Constitution.

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 8, 9 & 12

36. My complaint presented substantive facts without “bald assertions”. Such facts, must be taken as true (Opinion and Order, p.30). The revelations of organized and systemic corruption substantiates the statements that might have been otherwise labeled implausible.

The now-known lack of jurisdiction confirms the planned, improper and damaging actions by the defendants against me. Discovery will further substantiate the preliminary facts asserted. I made statements of fact and attempted to provide enough details (pursuant to Rules 8, 9, and 12) to demonstrate that the claims were not speculative and should not be summarily dismissed sua sponte without discovery.

37. I have state and federal constitutional rights of, inter alai, due process, which has been undisputedly denied me, and which begs this courts intervention.

38. Finally, and also new to this Honorable Court, are the words of the Honorable Joseph W. Bellacosa, former Judge of the New York State Court of Appeals and Chief Administrative Judge of the New York State Court System (Attached hereto as EXHIBIT “F”) .

Judge Bellacosa asks, “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?” (Who will watch the watchdogs?”) Briefly, Judge Bellacosa speaks directly to the need of this Court to take immediate and substantive action regarding the federal violations of law by New York State actors, and as herein complained of by plaintiff.

39. WHEREFORE, based on the facts, new information, fraud upon this court and the decisions cited above, plaintiff respectfully requests that this Honorable Court: grant the requested motion, REOPEN the instant 08cv2391 case, direct the Clerk of the Court to return the case to active status, and appoint a federal monitor to review the herein allegations and any and all such asserted allegations by those similarly situated.

DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY

The undersigned declares under penalty of perjury that he is the plaintiff in the above action, that he has read the above and that the information contained therein is true and correct, 28 U.S.C. § 1746; 18 U.S.C § 1621.

Dated: New York, New York
September 11, 2010

Respectfully submitted,

KEVIN MCKEOWN
Kevin McKeown, Pro Se
P.O. Box 616, New York, New York 10156
(212) 591-1022 tel - kmck22333@aol.com

TO: ANDREW M. CUOMO

Attorney General of the State of New York
Attn: Anthony J. Tomari, Assistant Attorney General
120 Broadway, 24th Floor,New York, New York 10271

Joseph F. McQuade, Esq.,Michael D. McQuade, Esq.,McQuade & McQuade
390 Fifth Avenue – Room 711,New York, New York 10018

Comments to the Above:

Shira’s conscience said…

Shira, Shira, Shira. What say you?

What say you, Shira, to federal prosecutors?
Can’t hear you. Please speak up.
Wait. Just not yet.
First, think of your judicial oath.
Yeah, yeah. That’s it.
Then speak up.
And speak loudly Judge Shira Scheindlin.

September 16, 2010 12:54 PM


Anonymous said…

good comment. my thoughts exactly.

September 16, 2010 12:59 PM


Anonymous said…

you see, there’s always a silver lining. sherry can now go drinking with the former chief counsel drunk- cahill, forget his first name right now, think it was shotglass. yeah, SHOTGLASS CAHILL.

September 16, 2010 1:21 PM


Anonymous said…

Sherry’s not alone. The rumor is that about 8 lawyers are leaving the DDC. Friedberg’s been acting especially paranoid lately. Maybe he should start drinking and take over where Sherry left off. Dont’ forget that Alan’s a corrupt chump like Sherry, actually bigger in some area.

September 16, 2010 1:37 PM


Anonymous said…

Does anyone see how sad all this is? Does anyone see these orders for these people to commit such hainous acts must have come from above and now they are all afraid……..sad……I thought her name was
Seltzer Cahill!One Seltzerra
Two Seltzerra
Three Seltzerra

FLOOR!

September 16, 2010 1:47 PM


Anonymous said…

Are the other litigants who had their cases thrown out going to refile?If there are more cases attacking these individuals and their corrupt actions, it should provide more evidence of a pervasive, systematic and long term pattern of corruption.Maybe then the DOJ will take action.

September 16, 2010 1:55 PM


LE said…

Sherry Cohen, Thomas Cahill, Naomi Goldstein, Alan Friedberg, David Spokany, all need to go directly to Jail!! Hey, do any of you guys know Attorney Allen H. Isaac, Esq. (GOD). I’m sure you do!!!!! How much did he pay you guys to protect him?ALLEN H. ISAAC, Esq. (Docket No: 2005.3074).

Isaac is a SEXUAL PREDATOR, WHO COMMITTED FELONY LEVEL CRIMES, received a mere slap on the wrist by the Appellate Court, First Dept. What a freaking JOKE that was!!!Court transcripts were altered, they withheld crucial evidence, they tampered with evidence.. and denied Esposito an attorney during the disciplinary hearings against Allen Isaac!!!

Naomi Goldstein, Esq. was promoted soon after the disciplinary proceedings against Allen Isaac. I’m sure she was handsomely rewarded for protecting him!!!!

Hey, what a stinking minute…How the HELL did the Appellate Court, First Department RULE on Allen H. Isaac’s fate in the first place when they are TOTALLY CONFLICTED!!!! Didn’t they hear Esposito’s A/V DVD tape?

September 16, 2010 2:17 PM


WOW said…

JUDGE SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN NEEDS TO DO THE RIGHT THING FOR ALL THE RELATED CASES…RE-OPEN THEM IS THE ONLY RIGHT THING TO DO..AND ASAP!!GOOD LUCK TO KEVIN MCKEOWN, ANDERSON, ESPOSITO, STEPHEN LAMONT, ELIOT BERNSTEIN, CAPOGROSSO, MCCORMICK, CARVEL, ETC……….

MAYBE NOW THEY’LL FINALLY DO THE RIGHT THING..JUDGE, THE WRITING IS ON THE WALL….CRIMES, CRIMES, CRIMES….JUSTICE, JUSTICE, JUSTICE!!!!!!JUDGE SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN CAN YOU HEAR US!!!!!!!!

September 16, 2010 2:23 PM


Anonymous said…

Luisa C. Esposito, Plaintiff, pro-se, filed her motion to reopen her FEDERAL COMPLAINT (07- Civ-11612 (SAS),last week. The Court issued an Order directing her defendants to reply by Sept. 17, 2010..DO YOU THINK they’re getting nervous?HOW and WHY did Esposito and the related cases get dismissed?

September 16, 2010 2:36 PM


T Finnan said…

Notice,the attorney for most of the defendants is Andrew Cuomo. Notice that many of the acts are federal and state crimes. Note that Andrew Cuomo has used NY State funds and employees to defend criminal acts. Did Andrew Cuomo obstruct Justice by interceding to defend criminal acts by some defendants?

Andrew Cuomo’s duty is to defend NY State interests and not the criminal acts by State employees.Luke 16:13 “No servant can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other. You cannot serve God and mammon.”Andrew Cuomo, you cannot serve the People of NY and Mammon’s corrupt NY courts.

September 16, 2010 6:41 PM

Anonymous said…

I don’t get it. Cuomo only serves one master. Himself.

September 16, 2010 7:32 PM


Eliot Bernstein Iviewit Inventor said…

Where are the beefy exhibits Frank E Baby? Anyone got beef with my hero Scheindlin for what she already did for you all by having Anderson sing death lullaby to Cahill, Sherry, AG Cuomo, Spookany, etc. must take it up with me, her soon to be Supreme Court chauffeur.

You never know what gun is put to the head of those who do the right thing immediately after and what it may cause them to do after, like gun to granddaughter head can be swaying to some but you can never forget that pristine moment of heroism.

You must worship it forever, despite what the future holds. Now be prepared in that scenario of Scheindlin acting off to fire off complaints against her if she does not follow the law but file them with love and pain, as I do with Catherine Wolfe and others.

To all those waiting for her, stop and do something bold with what is already before you, be proactive stop waiting for Frank or Shira or Cuomo, fire off some criminal complaints against all those Anderson fingered with everybody, the more the merrier.

And to those most unethical ethics officers who have cast an evil upon this land filled with pain and suffering and death, take comfort that I, Eliot and I A-m That I A-m have a special place for you in hell. I personally will be your eternal tour guide, if you think my writing is long wait until you hear my voice eternally damning you, 24.7.Eternally. Ask Cahill if his soul has been sucked from his being, ask him my name and you will see fear.

Sherry K. Cohen, I already have sucked the lifeblood from your soul. Remember me in Scheindlin’s court, the devilish looking angel that your eyes were fixated upon? Your breath sucked dry, as I sat directly in front of your lying and evil soulless body, remember the conversation that only you could hear?

I already hear your prayers, your whiney begging and know they will not be answered as that conversation was had, the jury out. This sentence will be long, slow and eternally painful, you will pray more and more for swift death but the beginning is now, death will not help, it is when the fun with you really begins.

Your Travel Guide to Hell
Bat Out of Hell
Mad Inventor
Eliot Ivan Bernstein

September 16, 2010 7:37 PM


Anonymous said…

Is this guy Bernstein for real????

September 16, 2010 7:51 PM


Anonymous said…

of course Eliot is real, read the last three salutations again, therein lies your answer!

September 16, 2010 8:02 PM


CLICK HERE TO SEE FILED DOCUMENT WITH EXHIBITS



Andrew Cuomo, New York Attorney General Disqualified in Major New York Corruption Case.

Time to Expose ALL Dark Corners, Secret Hand Shakes, Back Alley Deals in New York Corruption. Email Your New York Corruption To ~Crystal L. Cox .. Crystal@CrystalCox.com

Anderson Moves to Disqualify NY Attorney General

CLICK HERE TO READ ANDERSON’S FILING TO DISQUALIFY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

——————————————————————X
Christine C. Anderson,

Case No.: 07cv9599
Plaintiff-Appellant, (SAS) (AJP)

2d Cir. No. 09-5059-cv v.

The State of New York,
Defendants-Appellees.

——————————————————————X

NOTICE OF MOTION

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that upon the accompanying affirmation, Plaintiff-Appellant Christine C. Anderson will move this Honorable Court, at the United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, New York, New York 10007, at a date and time to be determined by the Court, for an order:

(1) DISQUALIFYING the Office of the New York State Attorney General from representation of defendants; and

(2) for such other and further relief as the Court may find just and proper.

Dated: New York, New York

September 14, 2010

Christine C. Anderson, plaintiff, pro se

227 Riverside Drive – Suite 2N

New York, New York 10025

917-817-7170 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting 917-817-7170 end_of_the_skype_highlighting tel

To: Monica Wagner, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Office of the NYS Attorney General, 120 Broadway, 24th floor, New York, New York 10271

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT



——————————————————————X
Christine C. Anderson,

Case No.: 07cv9599
Plaintiff-Appellant, (SAS) (AJP)

2d Cir. No. 09-5059-cv

v.

The State of New York,

Defendants-Appellees.

——————————————————————X



AFFIRMATION IN SUPPORT OF MOTION

I, Christine C. Anderson, make the following affirmation under penalties of perjury:

I, Christine C. Anderson, am the plaintiff-appellant in the above entitled action, and respectfully move this court to issue an order disqualifying the Office of the New York

State Attorney General from representing defendant-employees of the State of New York

in any legal proceeding involving the herein before any federal or state court, agency or any other tribunal. The reasons why I am entitled to the relief I seek, and pending remand to the district court for a new trial as herein explained, are the following:

I. Introduction

1. The trial court abused its discretion in denying my request for a new trial, a reversible error, inter alia. That error continues before this appellate body and requires immediate correction. Because of the unique perspective of the trial judge, the decision as to whether to grant a new trial is committed to the district court’s sound discretion and will be reversed only for a clear abuse of that discretion. Kempner Mobile Electronics, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, 428 F.3d 706, 716 (7th Cir. 2005); Latino v. Kaizer, 58 F.3d 310, 314 (7th Cir.1995). The trial judge advanced a miscarriage of justice by denying the application for a new trial. Remand is clearly indicated in this matter.

2. Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 does not list the grounds for which a new trial may be granted. (Wright § 95). In federal courts, common law must be looked to in determining the available grounds. Of the numerous grounds justifying a grant of new trial, one is that the “interests of justice” require a new trial. See e.g., Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Standard Havens, Inc., 901 F.2d 1373, 1379 (7th Cir. 1990) (affirming grant of new trial after a three-week jury trial). Among the grounds cited for seeking new trials are the following:

(1) Irregularity of the proceedings;

(2) Misconduct of jury;

(3) Accident or surprise;

(4) Newly discovered evidence;

(5) Insufficient evidence;

(6) Verdict against law;

(7) Error in law;

(8) Excessive or inadequate damages.

3. A court has broad discretion in considering a Rule 59(e) motion. Hagerman v. Yukon Energy Corp., 839 F.2d 407, 413 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 820 (1988). Rule 59(e) was adopted to clarify that “the district court possesses the power to rectify its own mistakes in the period immediately following the entry of judgment.” White v. New Hampshire Dep’t of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 450 (1982) (internal quotations omitted). A Rule 59(e) motion may be granted to correct a manifest error of law or fact, or to consider newly-discovered evidence. See Hagerman, 890 F.2d at 414.

II. The Attorney General’s Representation of the Defendants Constitutes

A Clear Conflict of Interest, and Violates Plaintiff’s Right to Due Process

4. In this action, plaintiff Anderson was confronted with an unquestionably unfair set of circumstances. She brought her complaint against three individuals, who, although employed by the State of New York, were also sued in their individual capacities. These defendants in turn were at all times represented by the New York State Attorney General. Thus, while the plaintiff charged the defendants with serious violations of law, the Attorney General stood before the jury defending these very same actions as proper and within the law. This arrangement seriously prejudiced the plaintiff, as jurors could and likely did conclude that the State of New York supported fully the conduct of the defendants.

Ongoing Conflict of Interest

5. Representation by the New York Attorney General’s office in the pending appeal continues the improper prejudice against plaintiff. Furthermore, not only did the Attorney General’s representation of the defendants unduly prejudice the plaintiff, but it also raised serious conflict of interest issues with respect to the defendants themselves. To protect their own rights, each of the defendants had to have their own attorneys in order to permit them to cross claim or make admissions, including their own right to protect their own individual rights in this appeal. Under New York State and federal conflict of interest rules, each of the defendants must be free to undertake these independent actions. To do so, they must have their own counsel. (See NYS Code of Professional Conduct Cannon 5 Conflict of Interest Rules.[1]) The Attorney General as a state attorney is bound by these rules as well. [2]

6. This constitutes New York State law, and the attorney who violates these safeguards must be immediately removed from the case. Further, should the defendants seek to waive the conflict- they would have to submit an affidavit to that effect to the court.

Notwithstanding a defendant’s attempt to waive his right to independent counsel, the court can deny the waiver, based on a finding that ultimately this conflict cannot properly be waived. The trail court improperly ignored the obligation to address the inherent conflict up to and including the trial. This court, however, must now disqualify the Attorney General from any representation of the defendants.

7. As a result of these conflict of interest issues, the Attorney General cannot properly represent the defendants, either as a group or individually, in these appellate proceedings. Each defendant must have the right to advance his or her own position on appeal, to cross claim against the others, and to bring a counterclaim against the State.

These actions most certainly could not be undertaken in a case where the Attorney General represents all the named defendants. All defendants clearly are in conflict with each other, especially in their individual capacities. Without question, the Attorney General violated its ethical rules and the public trust in undertaking to represent all of the defendants. The Attorney General continues to violate its ethical rules by appearing before this appellate body. This would be the case, even were it established that the defendants had sought to consent to such representation.

The Clear Need For Remand

8. The involvement of the New York Attorney General in refuting plaintiff’s allegations, which involved serious violations of federal and state law and ethical standards, and in presenting the case of each defendants, denied plaintiff’s due process and equal protection guarantees, and right to a fair and impartial trial. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (“if a practice or rule offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental”) and Eldridge v. Williams, 424 U.S. 319 335 (1974) [3]

9. The conflict here is particularly acute given the nature of the claims brought by plaintiff Anderson. Plaintiff’s charges warranted an independent investigation by the New York State Attorney General’s Office to review the basic claims given that Anderson was formerly a Departmental Disciplinary Committee staff attorney with considerable experience and over the years received excellent evaluations. The fact is that these are not allegations from a lay person.

10. While at the DDC, Plaintiff Anderson was charged with investigating cases involving possible criminal and civil misconduct by attorneys. She carried out her duties as a duly authorized officer of the Court. The New York State Attorney General’s Office was therefore obligated to protect her and to investigate her claims of serious misconduct against the named parties. To the Contrary, the New York State Attorney General’s Office failed to do so.

11. The Attorney General is a publicly funded arm of the State. It was conflicted from the outset of this case because it could not possibly defend any of the defendants, while simultaneously investigating plaintiff’s claims of serious ongoing misconduct by the defendants. Indeed, no explanation has ever been provided as to why the Attorney General did not represent plaintiff Anderson against any of the original defendants. This was itself a misappropriation of public funds by a state investigative agency with prosecution powers.

12. Federal law mandates that a special prosecutor be substituted into the case, and this was not done. The actions of the Attorney General here confused, misled and confounded the jury, by creating a false impression that the acts were officially sanctioned by the state.

13. Furthermore, Christine Anderson’s allegations have substantial impact on the public, the bench and bar, and cannot be ignored by the New York State Attorney General’s Office merely because they were motivated to defend this lawsuit. This serious conflict demanded independent counsel for the defendants as a matter of fairness and high ethical conduct to all involved, particularly to Christine Anderson. Having denied independent counsel to the defendants, the Attorney General prejudiced plaintiff by making it appear to the jury that the State of New York and the New York State Attorney General’s Office supported defendants’ conduct. This was a burden Christine Anderson could never overcome and, at a minimum, warrants a new trial. The unfair burden continues before this appellate court.

14. Additionally, Remand is also certain as the trial Court was concerned about the aforestated conflict of interest and in one of its last instructions to the jury, the Court warned the jury not to draw a negative inference adverse to the defendants for their joint representation by the New York State Attorney General’s Office. That instruction was injurious to the plaintiff, Christine Anderson, in that it prejudiced the jury against her and in and of itself warrants a new trial for the following reasons:

a. It was one of the last instructions to the jury and thus was ingrained in the minds of the jury as a lasting impression. Furthermore, as one of the last instructions to the jury, it elevated its importance over and above all prior instructions as something that had to be considered indifference to all else.

b. There was no countervailing instruction to the jury that it could find a negative inference of the representation by the New York State Attorney General’s Office favorable to the plaintiff. This failure prejudiced the jury against the plaintiff by implying at a minimum, that the state supported all of the defendants’ conduct and found that it was within the bounds of the law.

c. Had the Court even given the jury an instruction not to draw a negative inference of the representation of the defendants by the New York State Attorney General’s Office as against either or both the plaintiff and the defendants, such an instruction only demonstrates the proof that there is an impermissible conflict of interest in the manner in which this case was conducted, that can only hurt one party over another. Further, the representation by the New York State Attorney General’s Office made it appear New York State supported the defendants’ conduct and that it was within the bounds of the law.

d. By the Court issuing the jury instruction not to draw a negative inference adverse to the defendants for their representation by the New York State Attorney General’s Office, the court preserved the argument to be raised in this motion and appeal.

e. Allowing all of the defendants to be represented by the same counsel and by the New York State Attorney General’s Office created an impermissible conflict of interest. Indeed, the conflict was so strong, that had the jury ruled against any one or all of the defendants, they would have been entitled to seek a new trial for impermissible conflict of interest as they would entitled to their own independent counsel.

This court is thus faced with the fact any unsuccessful litigant in this case appeal could be expected to move for and would be entitled to a new trial because of the impermissible conflict of interest, as all of the defendants are required to have their own independent counsel, and to be represented their own counsel.

15. The American Bar Association’s Code of Professional Responsibility elaborates on the duty of a public prosecutor such as the New York Attorney General to seek justice as follows:

“This special duty exists because: (1) the prosecutor represents the sovereign and therefore should use restraint in the discretionary exercise of governmental powers, such as in the selection of cases to prosecute; (2) during trial the prosecutor is not only an advocate but he also may make decisions normally made by an individual client, and those affecting the public interest should be fair to all ….” (ABA Code of Prof. Responsibility, EC 7-13, emphasis added.)

16. Therefore, a prosecutor’s duty of neutrality is born of two fundamental aspects of his employment. First, the prosecutor, in this case the Attorney General, is a representative of the sovereign, and consequently must act with the impartiality required of those who govern. Second, the Attorney General can at all times call upon the vast power of the government, by utilizing public funds, and therefore must refrain from abusing that power by failing to act evenhandedly.

17. These key duties are not limited to criminal prosecutions, but must also be observed in civil cases as well. These safeguards are included in the ABA Code. “A government lawyer in a civil action or administrative proceeding has the responsibility to seek justice and to develop a full and fair record, and he should not use his position or the economic power of the government to harass parties or to bring about unjust settlements or results.” (Id., EC 7-14, emphasis added.)

18. In the present case, the Attorney General was under the ethical duty to withdraw in order to preserve plaintiff’s right to a fair and impartial trial. In a case such as this, not only is the Attorney General’s neutrality essential to a fair outcome for the plaintiff, it is critical to the proper function of the judicial process as a whole. Our system of justice relies for its validity on the confidence of society. Without a continuing belief by the people that the system is just and impartial, the concept of the rule of law cannot survive. (See id., EC 9-1, 9-2.)

19. The New York State Attorney General is a public official elected by statewide ballot [4]. The American Bar Association’s Code of Professional Responsibility addresses the special considerations applicable to a lawyer who is also a public official as follows: “A lawyer who is a public officer, whether full or part-time, should not engage in activities in which his personal or professional interests are or foreseeably may be in conflict with his official duties.” (ABA Code of Prof. Responsibility, EC 8-8.) “[A]n attorney holding public office should avoid all conduct which might lead the layman to conclude that the attorney is utilizing his public position to further his professional success or personal interests.” (ABA Committee on Prof. Ethics, opn. No. 192 (1939); see also People v. Conner, 34 Cal.3d 141, 146.)

20. The government’s investigative and prosecutorial interests must be balanced against the public interest in insuring that the individuals and organizations receive effective representation, and are accorded their full constitutional rights and protections.

21. There are at least two reasons why a court should satisfy itself that no conflict exists or at least provide notice to the affected party if one does. First, a court is under a continuing obligation to supervise the members of its Bar. E.g., In re Taylor, 567 F.2d at 1191; see Musicus v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 621 F.2d 742, 744 (5th Cir.1980) (per curiam) (district court obligated to take measures against unethical conduct occurring in proceedings before it). Second, trial courts have a duty “to exercise that degree of control required by the facts and circumstances of each case to assure the litigants of a fair trial.” Koufakis v. Carvel, 425 F.2d 892, 900-01 (2d Cir.1970); see ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(A)(4).

22. For example, when a litigant’s statutorily appointed counsel is acting against that person’s interests because of a conflict that the party has not been informed of and cannot be expected to understand on his own, it can be concluded that the litigant is not receiving a fair trial. Cf. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981) (divided loyalties of counsel may create due process violation).

23. Attorneys are officers of the court, Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 12, 53 S.Ct. 465, 468, 77 L.Ed. 993 (1933), and are obligated to adhere to all applicable disciplinary rules, and to report incidents of which they have unprivileged knowledge involving violations of a disciplinary rule. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 1-102(A), 1-103(A); see In re Walker, 87 A.D.2d 555, 560, 448 N.Y.S.2d 474, 479 (1st Dep’t 1982) (as officers of the court, attorneys are required to notify parties and the court of errors including conflicts of interest).

24. Occupying a position of public trust, the Attorney General, as any public prosecutor is ‘possessed … of important governmental powers that are pledged to the accomplishment of one objective only, that of impartial justice.’ (Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference (1958) 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1218.) The duty of a government attorney has been characterized as ‘a sober inquiry into values, designed to strike a just balance between the economic interests of the public and those of the landowner,’ is of high order.” (Id. at p. 871.)

25. Canon 9, “A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety,” has been invoked by this Court in attorney conflict cases. See, e.g., Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 234-35 (2d Cir.1977). The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted by the ABA House of Delegates on August 2, 1983 contain similar provisions and language. See Rules 1.7, 8.4.

26. Furthermore, and central to the issue of preventing prejudicial influence of government attorneys on court proceedings, it is common for states to adopt statutes or regulations that prohibit those holding the office of Attorney General, as well as their

deputies and staff attorneys, from participating as attorneys in private litigation matters. (see e.g. Arizona Revised Statutes §41-191[5] Attorney general; Florida Statutes, Section 27.51(3), [6] Maryland Statutes and Procedures Governing Pro Bono Services of Attorney General Office[7] .)

27. The reason for adopting these restrictions is most obvious. For the Attorney General or any member of the staff to participate in a civil trial involving a private litigant will create the prejudicial inference that the state has reviewed and approved the position advocated by the government attorney. Such an inference can and likely will influence the outcome of the matter to the detriment of the opposing party.

28. It is for the above stated reasons that no Attorney General or staff member should be permitted to represent a private litigant in any adversarial proceeding. Only such an outright prohibition will properly preserve the standards of fairness and impartiality guaranteed to all litigants under federal and state constitutions. The present lack of statutory and/or ethical policy guidelines barring the participation of state law officers from representing private litigants in civil proceedings must be addressed by courts even if not by policy makers.

III. The Attorney General’s Office Cannot Ethically Continue Any Representation

29. The irregularity of the proceedings below were confusing, misleading and prejudicial to the plaintiff enough without the involvement of the Attorney General. Indeed, remand will result after review of the Instructions to the jury, the court marked-up Verdict Sheet after a written jury question to the court concerning the whitewashing of attorney ethics complaints and wide-practiced corruption that, in fact, counsel for the defendants- The New York State Attorney General’s Office- had an obligation to investigate, inter alia.

30. Improperly, the top law enforcement officer of the state was silent and action was, and is, absent. This cannot be condoned by this appellate court.

31. The involvement of the Attorney General’s office improperly left the jury, and proceeding itself, in an unclear, puzzling and convoluted condition. This confusion resulted in a proceeding which is in a word repugnant.

32. The mere presence of the Attorney General has at all times been prejudicial to the plaintiff and, at best, confusing to the jury. It has been established that both inconsistent or equivocal instructions and incorrect statements of the law may be prejudicially erroneous, Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612, 66 S.Ct. 402, 90 L.Ed. 350 (1946); United States v. Neilson, 471 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1973); Bolden v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co, 468 F.2d 580; Ratay v. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co., 378 F.2d 209 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 973, 88 S.Ct. 472, 19 L.Ed.2d 465 (1967), and that comments made by the court shortly before the jury retires are critical, Norfleet v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 355 F.2d 359, 362 (2d Cir. 1966).

33. The lower court improperly allowed representation of the defendants by the Attorney General. In fact, the court below improperly condoned the Attorney General’s presence, accordingly directing the jury that the Attorney General’s representation was proper when it was not. It is generally assumed that juries “act in accordance with the instructions given them…and that they do not consider and base their decisions on legal questions with respect to which they are not charged.” Dist. Council 37 v. New York City Dept. of Parks and Recreation 113 F3d 347,356 (2d Cir. 1997).

34. It was never up to the jury to consider the ethical failings of the Attorney General’s representation. It was the obligation of the Attorney General’s office, and upon the failure of that duty, the obligation of the court.

35. There is also no record that the role of the Attorney General as defense counsel was properly and adequately explained to the jury. While this also constitutes another reversible error by the Court which will be addressed by the appeal itself, representation of the Attorney General’s office improperly remains.

IV. Newly Discovered Evidence At Trial Required Immediate Disqualification

36. The court gave the jury above-referenced instructions and its members adjourned to the jury room to deliberate at approximately 1:25 pm on Thursday, October 29, 2009. After the jury left the courtroom, the court first announced that she had denied the defendants’ pending motion for a directed verdict. She next stated words to the effect that she found that , “….Cahill was aware of the whitewashing allegations…” (Exhibit A, pages 808-809) The judge read this statement related to defendant Cahill’s conduct into the record as part of her order denying defendant’s directed verdict. This fact alone requires a new trial, and should have resulted in the Attorney General’s office immediately withdrawing from the case.

37. In addition, Courts have an obligation to report and order investigation into official and at times criminal misconduct. This is a duty of the Court. There is no record to date as to any action having been undertaken by the Court regarding this central question. (See also recent decisions on spoliation of evidence which are state and federal crimes. Acorn v. Nassau County - cv052301 (2009 USDistLEXIS 19459) and Gutman v. Klein, 03cv1570. 2008 WL 5084182, 2008 WL 4682208.

38. The Court’s finding of culpability on the part of Defendant Cahill constitutes newly discovered evidence, which directly supports the fundamental allegations of Plaintiff.

Remand to the District Court for a new trial is highly likely as the trial court abused its discretion in denying a new trial. The Attorney General’s failure to withdraw is, in fact, sanctionable and worthy of referral to the attorney ethics committee.

39. Clearly the newly discovered fact that defendant Cahill, as the head of the DDC and supervisor of the other named defendants, had full knowledge of whitewashing activities would in all likelihood have changed the outcome of the case. This central fact establishing the liability of all named defendants could not have been discovered earlier and is not merely cumulative or impeaching. (See Farragher v. Boca Raton , 524 U.S. 775, 18 S. Ct. 2275 (1998) which imputes liability to supervisors in any event. In Farragher, the Supreme Court held that an employer is vicariously liable for actionable discrimination caused by a supervisor. All defendants are jointly and severally liable here. In fact, the State of New York is liable under Faragher, all while representation of the Attorney General’s office improperly continued.

JUDICIAL FINDING KEPT FROM A DELIBERATING JURY

40. Here, the new evidence establishes that in the view of the Court, Defendant Cahill, the head officer of the DDC and the supervisor of the other defendants, had full knowledge of the practice of whitewashing as alleged by Plaintiff, leading to the parallel conclusion that whitewashing was accepted as a common practice by the defendants, and presumably other staff members of the DDC. Had such facts been confirmed during the trial stage, the jury would have come to know and understand the illegal activities that were accepted as everyday practice by the DDC staff, a finding totally consistent with a main element of Plaintiff’s case. At all times relevant, however, the Attorney General’s office improperly continued their representation of the very people the Court found had acted illegally.

41. The Court’s statement after the close of trial accepting the establishing the whitewashing activities by Defendant Cahill will demand remand for a new trial. Meanwhile, the damage to the rule of law and ethics by the Attorney General’s office must be dealt with by this appellate court.

V. Witness Tampering – Threat on Witness in a Federal Proceeding

42. The Attorney General and the trial court were aware that in August of 2008, one of the plaintiff’s witnesses, DDC staff attorney Nicole Corrado, was threatened. Two days prior to her deposition testimony, state employee, and DDC Deputy Chief Counsel, Andral N. Bratton, and who had been her immediate supervisor for approximately 5 years, confronted Corrado. Bratton advised Corrado that in 2007 he had admitted himself into a psychiatric hospital for serious emotional problems, that he had “suicidal tendencies,” and that he was “warning” her accordingly. When Corrado asked Bratton why he was warning her, Bratton simply repeated several times in a very serious and stern tone by saying, “I’m just warning you.”

43. Following Corrado’s deposition testimony on August 21, 2008, Bratton’s behavior toward Corrado became more harassing, troubling, frightening and threatening as he began to follow her inside and outside of the state office where they both worked. Corrado subsequently reported these serious issues to DDC chief counsel Allan Friedberg, Deputy chief Counsel Sherry Cohen, a defendant in the current proceeding, and DDC Chief Investigator Vincent Raniere- all of whom who took no required action.

44. Plaintiff’s former counsel, John Beranbaum, advised the court, and by copy, the Attorney General, of this incident in a letter to the court dated October 24, 2008. In the Beranbaum submission, it was made clear to the court and the Attorney General that Ms. Corrado was given a ‘“warning’ about the testimony she was to gave at the deposition[,]” and further advised that “Ms. Corrado is very upset about the entire experience.

45. Mr. Beranbaum again raised the issue on the record four days later on October 30, 2008. (See Exhibit, “B” – Transcript of October 30, 2008 hearing, Page 26 (lines 17-25), and page 27 (lines 1-8). The court, in responding to the letter advising of the threat on plaintiff’s witness, commented, “You [Mr. Beranbaum] seem to want to tell me something or report it to me. Okay. You report it to me.”

46. It is plaintiff’s belief that the court had an obligation to report the matter to federal agents and, further, to interview Ms. Corrado concerning the incident. In addition, the Attorney General also had an obligation as the state’s top enforcer of the law.

47. Plaintiff believes she has been severely prejudiced by the threat upon her witness, Ms. Corrado, and, as the lower court and Attorney General were aware, Ms. Corrado did not appear as a witness in this proceeding.

48. While plaintiff is aware that counsel within the Office of the New York Attorney General’s office offered to “fully” compensate Mr. Beranbaum for ALL of his legal fees, expenses, etc., if plaintiff settled her case, she is unaware of the exact timing of when the compensation offer, believed to be between $120,000.00 and $150,000.00, was actually made.

VI. Conclusion

49. For the reasons set forth, Moving respectfully requests that this Court in the interest of justice issue an order restraining the Office of the New York State Attorney General’s office from representing employees of the State of New York in any legal proceeding involving the herein before any federal or state court, agency or any other tribunal grant a new trial.

50. As noted, the participation of the Attorney General in failing to investigate the charges submitted by plaintiff against the defendants, and subsequently representing these same persons in the instant court proceedings, denied plaintiff’s constitutionally protected right to a fair and impartial trial. This denial of basic rights was compounded by unclear, confusing and convoluted instructions to the jury, discovery of new evidence and serious allegations of intimidation of witnesses, which all support the de novo pending appeal and granting of the instant motion for disqualification.

51. Wherefore, Moving respectfully requests that the court grant the within Motion, as well as such other and further relief that may be just and proper. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on September 14, 2010

New York, New York Christine C. Anderson

Plaintiff, Pro Se



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/ny/code/NY_CODE.HTM ; Conflict of Interest Disciplinary Rule 5

http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/ny/code/

[2] As head of the Department of Law, the Attorney General is both the “People’s Lawyer” and the State’s chief legal officer. As the “People’s Lawyer,” the Attorney General serves as the guardian of the legal rights of the citizens of New York, its organizations and its natural resources.

In his role as the State’s chief legal counsel, the Attorney General not only advises the Executive branch of State government, but also defends actions and proceedings on behalf of the State. http://www.oag.state.ny.us/our_office.html


[3] The Supreme Court set out the following balancing test for applying procedural due process protections: “[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and, finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”

[4] The fact that the Attorney General is elected by the voters of New York State raises a question with respect to the qualification of the jurors. No juror in the present case was asked whether he or she had voted for Attorney General Andrew Cuomo at the last election, or, for that matter, whether they supported the actions undertaken by him since assuming office, or further. whether they, as a general matter, agree with the general or specific policies of or initiatives undertaken and/or advocated by his office.

[5] B. The attorney general and his assistants shall devote full time to the duties of the office and shall not directly or indirectly engage in the private practice of law or in an occupation conflicting with such duties, except:

1. Such prohibition shall not apply to special assistants, except that in no instance shall special assistants engage in any private litigation in which the state or an officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.

2. Assistant attorney general may, but in no circumstances shall be required to, represent private clients in pro bono, private civil matters under the following circumstances:

(a) The representation will be conducted exclusively during off hours or while on leave and the attorney will not receive any compensation for such services.

(b) The client is not seeking an award of attorney fees for the services.

(c) The services are for an individual in need of personal legal services who does not have the financial resources to pay for the professional services or for a nonprofit, tax exempt charitable organization formed for the purpose of providing social services to individuals and families.

(d) The representation will not interfere with the performance of any official duties.

(e) The subject matter of pro bono representation is outside of the area of practice to which the attorney is assigned in the attorney general’s office and the activity will not appear to create a conflict of interest.

(f) The activity will not reflect adversely on this state or any of its agencies.

(g) The assistant attorney general’s position will not influence or appear to influence the outcome of any matter.

(h) The activity will not involve assertions that are contrary to the interest or position of this state or any of its agencies.

(i) The activity does not involve a criminal matter or proceeding or any matter in which this state is a party or has a direct or substantial interest.

(j) The activity will not utilize resources that will result in a cost to this state or any of its agencies.

(k) The attorney’s supervisor may require the attorney to submit a prior written request to engage in pro bono work which includes a provision holding the agency harmless from any of the work undertaken by the attorney.

[6] Florida Statutes,Section 27.51 provides:”Each public defender shall serve on a full-time basis and is prohibited from engaging in the private practice of law while holding office. Assistant public defenders shall give priority and preference to their duties as assistant public defenders and shall not otherwise engage in the practice of criminal law.” (e.s.)

[7] Private practice of Law and Pro Bono Representation.

Posted by Corrupt Courts Administrator at 7:43 AM

17 comments:

Have had it with cuomo said…

I like Anderson’s vote on Election Day! Great motion!
Everyone should vote on the next election day to DISQUALIFY everyone who currently holds office of any kind. Yep, Andy, that includes you. The thuggery at the attorney general’s office must end. Andy and Elliot can go off and play golf, etc., with Tiger. New Yorkers have had it with spineless, ass-kissing-for-supporters-only corrupt bastards operating under the color of law. I’m a lifelong democrat but will NOT be voting for Andrew Cuomo ever again.

September 15, 2010 8:44 AM

Anonymous said…

The Office of Andrew Cuomo is pro pedophiles and that is why he protects his friends such as Bernadette E. Lupinetti, Esq. from Orange County New York. A pimp selling children in child custody cases to be sexually exploited.

September 15, 2010 9:08 AM

Anonymous said…

Christine Anderson you rock!

Albany, Andy, Houston

You got a problem!

Paladino won!

September 15, 2010 9:09 AM

Anonymous said…

Christine Anderson you rock!

Albany, Andy, Houston

You got a problem!

Paladino won!

September 15, 2010 9:09 AM


Anonymous said…

Andy and Eliot can take Sheldon & Lippman with them!

The baseball bats are out guys!

September 15, 2010 9:10 AM

Anonymous said…

“THERE IS NO CRUELER TYRANNY THAN THAT WHICH IS OPERATED UNDER THE COVER OF LAW AND WITH THE COLORS OF JUSTICE”

September 15, 2010 9:12 AM

Anonymous said…

Bratton advised Corrado that in 2007 he had admitted himself into a psychiatric hospital for serious emotional problems, that he had “suicidal tendencies,” and that he was “warning” her accordingly

what was this guy going to make up paperwork for her, pass it around behind her back………
that is an old one
you guys gotta think of new tricks!

September 15, 2010 9:25 AM

LE said…

Christine, you’re my hero!! Now, let’s ALL go after the AG’s Office full force with our motion’s to disqualify!!!

I can’t wait to see how the AG’s Office responds to my motion and letter to disqualify!!

Best Regards,

LE

September 15, 2010 10:45 AM

Anonymous said…

this is very interesting. will be more interesting to see some real action come from it and best of luck to Christine Anderson.

I’ve been watching these comments about Will Galison being a “plant”. Let me get this straight:

Hoffer is the son-in-law of Zbigniew Brzezinski and therefore a pawn of the CFR and the New World Order

The FBI is the organization that hasn’t done a damn thing for us all this time and has harmed many of us.

Golia is the judge who stole Sunny Sheu’s house from him and had him kidnapped according to an NYPD Officer and you can read about this at the BlackStarNews.com.

Golia may or could be involved in the death / murder of Sunny Sheu and it is absolutely clear that Golia has some serious problems with the Sunny Sheu case by permitting the Finance Company involved in Illegally “buying back” Sunny’s property from a Fraudulent Buyer that the Finance Company should have never Closed with in the first place and did so for only $1000 when Sunny’s mortgage had been at just over $200,000.

That type of great “under market price” transaction is PER SE SUSPECT to any reputable member of the Judiciary or Oversight or Federal authorities not to mention Sunny had 2 NYPD Officers who were trying to come forward before Golia with evidence from the Criminal prosecution of the Fraud - Fake buyer and Seller in the first place??

So, these three parties are “pissed” at Will Galison, and that makes Galison ……bad?

September 15, 2010 11:53 AM

Eliot Bernstein / Bat Out of Hell / Iviewit said…

Go Christine, I sat on the edge of my seat and wondered when the charge of criminal Title 18 Obstruction and Obstruction of Fed Witness and Obstruction through Conflict would be asserted against the AG Clown Cuomo but I guess it is there subtly in the call for Special Prosecutor and Obligations of those in charge.

Still I feel that Court should be put on notice that allowing the conflict is obstruction so if they continue, wham we are reporting it and their felonies to the man, right now the man with no cajones, HoldOff and other appropriate oversight and criminal authorities. Every related case should file this document with criminal authorities with jurisdiction demanding investigation. Where’s the Press???
Who is Will?

Bat Out of Hell on Bat Phone Calling the Troops.

Question for Luisa have you filed to get rid of NY AG Cuomo or filed criminal complaints against the office for their part in the gang raping of your rights and personal liberties to cover up for slimedog millionaire Isaacs?

Eliot I. Bernstein
Inventor

Check Out
Eliot’s Testimony at the NY Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings Part 1
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Cw0gogF4Fs&feature=player_embedded
and

Part 2 @
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Apc_Zc_YNIk&feature=related
and
Christine Anderson Whistleblower Testimony @
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6BlK73p4Ueo
and

Eliot Part 1 - The Iviewit Inventions @
http://www.wethepeopletv.com/

September 15, 2010 2:11 PM

Anonymous said…

Is there anyone else who is going to Federal Court to file for violation of Civil Rights for the failure of the OCA, Disciplinary Commissions, Courts, etc., to protect Constitutionally Protected rights and to do the jobs they are required to do by law and rule?

Just asking.

September 15, 2010 2:15 PM

Anonymous said…

All the Anderson info and action is great. But, if the Feds were really going to “rock” NY as stated over two years ago, you may think they would just show up to this event tomorrow sponsored by the Wall Street Journal featuring Gov Paterson and former Govs Spitzer and Pataki.

Markopoulous contacted Spitzer as AG about Madoff and we all know Frank Brady and Kevin McKeown wrote to Governor Paterson about a Special Prosecutor and Pataki’s links to corruption and likely organized crime are infamous even though the Feds never did anything about it and stuck New Yorkers with this great system

Think the G-Men will show up? Not talking about the Football Giants here either:

http://blog.timesunion.com/capitol/archives/31797/spitzer-paterson-pataki-all-on-one-great-stage/

September 15, 2010 4:11 PM

Anonymous said…

Has anyone clued the Paladino campaign into this blog and Cuomo’s history of ignoring complaints?

Cuomo’s has done nothing in the four years he’s been AG, and now he is campaigning as someone who is going to clean up the mess he’s been ignoring.

I hope Paladino has the stuff to call him on this.

September 15, 2010 6:16 PM

Anonymous said…

Yes, I hope Paladino takes Cuomo’s mask off and ask him about the sexual abusers he helps.

September 15, 2010 7:19 PM

T Finnan said…

Answer to 2:15; yes within this week. Answer to 6:16; yes; Paladino is aware. AG Cuomo has covered up corruption with his office. CuomoTARP.blogspot.com exposes and will expose more about Cuomo. Check out: Two faces as Cuomo changes pay to play to indirect payment; or, Cuomo as Gollum; or, the Cuomo babuska doll and its faces of Cuomo; or, Cuomo’s silver spoon removed; or,Cuomo drenched in Albany Swamp Slime; or,Cuomo, 1.2 billion fraud, is it the Peter or Dilbert principle; or, Cuomo as Keystone cop; and Can Cuomo clean his nest.

September 15, 2010 7:25 PM

Eliot said…

Ok, if none of you NuYookers have the cojones (excuse my vulgarity) to arrest Cuomo, Spitzer and some Lawyers & Judges who are actually criminals I guess I will just have to fly there again and citizen arrest their criminal butts.

First, I would get the kids and huddle them together for a protest party. We would need signs so that we could march on their lawns first and greet them at dawn with video cameras and loud questions demanding public answers.

Then follow them to work with a set of leg iron and cuffs, demand they turn themselves in or else, when they run like the cowards they are, chase them down, tackle them and bring them in for prosecution of their felonies despite name, elitist delusion, position or title.

In New York we don’t give a damn who or what you are, if you ripped us off we want blood and all our money back. Wait, you NuYookers really want a Cubbie fan to clean your shit hole of corruption, I guess if necessary, I will but I thought more of you.

Next, once we have chained them and cuffed them and although my personal desire would be to torture them for those they have tortured and wronged in their crimes but I am not them, so I will leave that to the long arm of justice to decide and a jury of their peers.

If Justice fails to do justice claiming others above the law or immune why just grab their butt, cuff them and take them to the next available processing center for felons, you got rights NuYookers, use them.

http://www.newyorkinjurylaw-blog.com/2010/05/citizen%E2%80%99s-arrest-new-york-personal-injury-attorney

The definition is simple enough: a “citizen’s arrest” is an arrest by any civilian (not necessarily a “citizen” in some states) who does not have official government authority to make an arrest. In fact “citizen arrests” are legal in every state, though state laws with respect to the situations in which such arrests are permissible vary.

As a general rule, every state permits a civilian to make an arrest if a “felony” (a very serious crime) is being perpetrated in the presence of that civilian. Where differences among the states occur is in matters involving “misdemeanors” (less serious crimes), and where a felony is not witnessed by the civilian.

Since 2007, Karl Rove has (at least) three times been the subject of attempted citizen’s arrests. In Iowa last July, a group of four attempted to place him under citizen’s arrest when he went to Des Moines to speak at a fundraiser.

As it would turn out, the four would be citizen-constables were themselves arrested. They were subsequently cited for trespassing and released. The Cedar Rapids Gazette reported that two of the four had attempted a citizen’s arrest of Rove one year previously. That time they were also arrested, but were released without charges.

In October, a Code Pink protester in San Francisco tried to slap the cuffs on Rove for treason while he participated in a panel discussion for the Mortgage Bankers Association’s annual convention. Code Pink’s official release on the incident (which contains the Arrest Complaint against Rove) states that five protesters were removed from the building but not charged.

So, can people legally perform citizen’s arrests? The short answer is yes. In virtually all states, private individuals can lawfully arrest someone whom they witness committing a felony.

New York State Consolidated Laws hold that:Any person may arrest another person (a) for a felony when the latter has in fact committed such felony, and (b) for any offense when the latter has in fact committed such offense in his presence. New York Penal Code§ 140.05 Arrest without a warrant; in general.

A person who has committed or is believed to have committed an offense and who is at liberty within the state may, under circumstances prescribed in this article, be arrested for such offense although no warrant of arrest therefor has been issued and although no criminal action therefor has yet been commenced in any criminal court.

§ 140.30 Arrest without a warrant; by any person; when and where authorized.

1. Subject to the provisions of subdivision two, any person may arrest another person (a) for a felony when the latter has in fact committed such felony, and (b) for any offense when the latter has in fact committed such offense in his presence.

2. Such an arrest, if for a felony, may be made anywhere in the state. If the arrest is for an offense other than a felony, it may be made only in the county in which such offense was committed.

§ 140.35 Arrest without a warrant; by person acting other than as a police officer or a peace officer; when and how made.

1. A person may arrest another person for an offense pursuant to section 140.30 at any hour of any day or night.

2. Such person must inform the person whom he is arresting of the reason for such arrest unless he encounters physical resistance, flight or other factors rendering such procedure impractical.

3. In order to effect such an arrest, such person may use such physical force as is justifiable pursuant to subdivision four of section

35.30 of the penal law.

§ 140.40 Arrest without a warrant; by person acting other than as a police officer or a peace officer; procedure after arrest.

1. A person making an arrest pursuant to section 140.30 must without unnecessary delay deliver or attempt to deliver the person arrested to the custody of an appropriate police officer, as defined in subdivision five. For such purpose, he may solicit the aid of any police officer and the latter, if he is not himself an appropriate police officer, must assist in delivering the arrested person to an appropriate officer.

If the arrest is for a felony, the appropriate police officer must, upon receiving custody of the arrested person, perform all recording, fingerprinting and other preliminary police duties required in the particular case.

In any case, the appropriate police officer, upon receiving custody of the arrested person, except as otherwise provided in subdivisions two and three, must bring him, on behalf of the arresting person, before an appropriate local criminal court, as defined in subdivision five, and the arresting person must without unnecessary delay file an appropriate accusatory instrument with such court.

2. If (a) the arrest is for an offense other than a class A, B, C or D felony or a violation of section 130.25, 130.40, 205.10, 205.17, 205.19 or 215.56 of the penal law and (b) owing to unavailability of a local criminal court the appropriate police officer having custody of the arrested person is unable to bring him before such a court with reasonable promptness, the arrested person must be dealt with in the manner prescribed in subdivision three of section 140.20, as if he had been arrested by a police officer.

3. If the arrest is for an offense other than a class A, B, C or D felony or a violation of section 130.25, 130.40, 205.10, 205.17, 205.19 or 215.56 of the penal law, the arrested person need not be brought before a local criminal court, as provided in subdivision one, and the procedure may instead be as follows:

(a) An appropriate police officer may issue and serve an appearance ticket upon the arrested person and release him from custody, as prescribed in subdivision two of section 150.20; or

(b) The desk officer in charge at the appropriate police officer’s station, county jail or police headquarters, or any of his superior officers, may, in such place, fix pre-arraignment bail and, upon deposit thereof, issue and serve an appearance ticket upon the arrested person and release him from custody, as prescribed in section 150.30.

4. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a police officer is not required to take an arrested person into custody or to take any other action prescribed in this section on behalf of the arresting person if he has reasonable cause to believe that the arrested person did not commit the alleged offense or that the arrest was otherwise unauthorized.

5. If a police officer takes an arrested juvenile offender into custody, the police officer shall immediately notify the parent or other person legally responsible for his care or the person with whom he is domiciled, that the juvenile offender has been arrested, and the location of the facility where he is being detained.

6. As used in this section:

(a) An “appropriate police officer” means one who would himself be authorized to make the arrest in question as a police officer pursuant to section 140.10;

(b) An “appropriate local criminal court” means one with which an accusatory instrument charging the offense in question may properly be filed pursuant to the provisions of section 100.55. ""

Wednesday, September 8, 2010

Bitterroot Public Library in Hamilton Montana will do ANYTHING to Suppress the Truth of Montana Corruption.

Bitterroot Public Library

Bitterroot Public Library - Aids and Abets Montana Corruption and Fights with all they can to Keep you from a Letter to the President on Hamilton Corruption.

More on Control, Corruption, and Cover ups at the Bitterroot Public Library
www.HamiltonMontanaNews.net

More on Montana Corruption, Bitterroot Public Library and Setting up the Innocent to Cover Up Montana Corruption.

www.MichaelSpreadbury.com

Bitterroot Public Library - Where the Truth is Suppressed, Where you have No Civil Rights, and at the Bitterroot Public Library, Hamilton Montana is Using your Montana Tax Dollars to Hide the TRUTH from You.

The Bitterroot Public Library

Montana Supreme Court Supporting Montana Corruption? SHOCKING...
all over a Tax Paying Citizen wanting a Library to NOT Suppress information, Create Victims, and Harass Innocent Montana Citizens.
http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/montana/article_f6a11888-ab99-11df-94b8-001cc4c03286.html

The Corrupt Bitterroot Public Library in Hamilton Montana Banned a Citizen for Simply wanting you to have access to the Truth. Of Course the Corruption Hamilton Montana News makes you think that the Bitterroot Public Library is in the RIGHT.. and they are Certainly Not.

The Montana Supreme Court HAS to stand behind Hamilton Corruption, they cannot afford NOT to.. DO NOT believe me.. Find the TRUTH yourself, look at the Facts, at Documents and not at what Lies.. and Propaganda fed to you from Montana Corruption.

Here is a Link to the Bitterroot Public Library story on the Set up of who they now call an "Ex-Candidate" - funny before that he was lots of other names.. however THE Truth is that Michael Spreadbury only wants you to have access to the Truth.. and wants Hamilton Officials and the Bitterroot Public Library to obey the Laws that everyone Else has to.

""HAMILTON — The city of Hamilton has dropped a trespassing charge against a former mayoral candidate after the state Supreme Court upheld a protection order that effectively bars him from the Bitterroot Public Library.

City attorney Ken Bell said Wednesday the library only wants to protect its patrons and staff, and the Aug. 10 Supreme Court ruling against Michael Spreadbury does that. ""

http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/montana/article_f6a11888-ab99-11df-94b8-001cc4c03286.html

This article is Lying, the County Attorney is not telling you the Truth .. Look Deeper..

KNOWLEDGE is Power...

Michael Spreadbury was NOT endangering the Bitterroot Public Library staff or the Bitterroot Public Library "patrons" .

Michael Spreadbury was simply trying to Expose the Fact that the Bitterroot Public Library was Suppressing information at the request of Corrupt Law Enforcement and this is a Violation of Your Rights.. and the Bitterroot Public Library had no right to act how they did.. however Rights and Laws MEAN nothing in the POWERFUL Wall of Corruption in Hamilton Montana.

YOU have no Rights in Hamilton Montana and
the TRUTH means NOTHING...


YOU could have a thousand documents of Proof of your Innocence and if they say GUILTY .. well it is and ALL have to stand behind that Wall of Corruption or they are next.. and the Montana Supreme Court backs them up as there are to many secrets known..

The Bitterroot Public Library along with the Ring of Corruption in Hamilton Montana has Violated the Rights of Montana Citizens for Years.. and NO ONE can STOP them..

A Montana Supreme Court Decision to Keep YOU from the "Library" - if this Does Not Raise your Need for the TRUTH, not Sure What Will.

Demand ALL accounting of the City of Hamilton, Which is NOT a Legal City Right?

Yet the sure to Terrorize Citizens.. and have Control over the Montana Legal System.. Right or Wrong.. Who Funds the Bitterroot Public Library ? Where Do all Bitterroot Public Library Funds Go? Expose Government Corruption and Get a Whistleblower Reward under the False Claims Act.


Links to the Truth About Hamilton Montana and the Bitterroot Public Library

http://www.bitterroot-rising.org/9.html

www.MichaelSpreadbury.com

http://www.bitterroot-rising.org/index.html

www.HamiltonMontanaNews.net

http://mtjustice.info/
See What all the Fuss is REALLY about with this
BAN the TRUTH from the Bitterroot Public Library

Posted here By
Investigative Blogger
Crystal L. Cox